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SUMMARY
In order to contain a measles outbreak in a German asylum-seekers’ shelter, serological testing of
all residents was performed, followed by selective vaccination of those with negative test results/
not tested. In this paper we describe the outbreak epidemiologically and then compare the
implemented strategy with a hypothetical mass vaccination of all individuals unvaccinated or
with unknown vaccination status born after 1970 as recommended by the German Standing
Committee on Vaccination in terms of potentially avoided cases, logistics, and costs. Three
hundred (70%) residents participated in the serological testing, of which 39 (13%) were
seronegative. In total, 144 individuals were eligible for vaccination, while a mass vaccination
would have targeted 359 persons. However, serological testing was time- and personnel
consuming and revealed several logistical problems. Its costs amounted to E90 000, double that
of mass vaccination that additionally might have avoided three of the eight cases. Mass
vaccination seems the preferred measure for measles outbreak control in such settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Measles is one of the most contagious infectious dis-
eases, a viral disease that can cause severe morbidity
and complications such as pneumonia or encephalitis.
Its case-fatality rate is estimated to be 0.2% in devel-
oped countries [1] and 3–5% in developing countries
[2]. A vaccine has been available since 1963 [1],
but population vaccination coverage has to exceed
92–95% to prevent outbreaks [3]. Besides a routine
two-dose measles vaccination strategy in childhood,
the German Standing Committee on Vaccination
(STIKO) recommends immediate vaccinations in
measles outbreak settings. The intervention [i.e. one
dose of measles virus (MV)-containing vaccine]
should target all persons born after 1970 (with the
exception of children aged f6 months and pregnant
women) that are either unvaccinated, received
only one vaccination during childhood, or whose
immunization status is unknown [4].
In the past 6 years, 19 000–43 000 persons annually
have been seeking asylum status in Germany [5, 6].
They are housed upon their arrival in admittance
shelters in all 16 federal states, based on a preset state
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quota for intake per year. Each of these shelters hosts
several hundred persons of various ethnicities. Living
conditions are crowded and individuals remain for
at least 6 weeks up to several months until a final
decision regarding their refugee status has been made.
The German Asylum Seeker Benefits Law stipulates
that asylum seekers are entitled to receive all vacci-
nations recommended by STIKO for the general
German population. The ensuing costs are thereby
covered by the responsible asylum-seeker authorities
instead of the statutory health insurance funds pro-
viding for the general population [7].
During the last years, outbreaks of varicella and
measles have been reported in migrant populations or
in asylum shelters in Germany [8, 9]. The STIKO rec-
ommendations contain no specific regulations for the
management of communicable disease outbreaks in
shelters, and on-site management of the outbreak lies
with the discretion of the responsible district health
authority where the shelter is located. In general,
outbreaks in such settings impose unique challenges
on local health authorities involving language
barriers, cultural differences, potentially dismissive
habitus of residents towards public authorities due to
previous negative experiences, large family sizes, and
unavailability of medical or vaccination records.
These challenges become even more severe as con-
tainment actions require a rapid response to prevent
further cases.
In October–November 2010, a measles outbreak
occurred in a shelter in Northern Germany with a total
of eight cases in the 427 residents. The shelter usually
accommodates about 400 residents frommany nations
with 4–6 people sharing one room and about 80 people
living on each floor. The shelter has a common dining
room and hosts a kindergarten and school. A medical
post in the shelter grounds performs the statutory
medical examinations at intake and provides medical
services during weekdays. For identification, the shel-
ter administration issues identity cards upon arrival
that include information on name, sex, birth date,
shelter entry date and nationality. Children are either
added on the mother’s or father’s identity card.
As available public health resources in Germany
are decreasing and measles-mumps-rubella (MMR)
vaccine doses are comparatively expensive, local
health authorities increasingly consider the alternative
of prior serological testing of all shelter residents fol-
lowed by a selective vaccination for those without
protective measles antibodies instead of a mass
vaccination. Compatible with this observation, the
local health authorities in charge decided upon sero-
logical testing and selective vaccinations in this recent
measles outbreak.
Previously published studies have focused on the
cost comparison of different vaccination strategies
and the costs related to individual patients [10–12].
Some studies analysed the comprehensive costs of a
measles outbreak [13–15] but did not incorporate the
comparison of different outbreak control strategies.
The objective of our study was first, to give an epi-
demiological description of the outbreak and second,
evaluate the executed strategy against a hypothetical
immediate mass vaccination in terms of potentially
avoided cases, logistics, and costs.
METHODS
Epidemiological description and timeline of the
outbreak
We described the time-course of the outbreak, basic
demographics of the shelter population, percentages
of residents participating in the voluntary serological
testing and vaccination, and seronegativity by age
group. The epidemiological description was based on
the official residents list and complemented by the
review of information on residents’ identity cards
during the serological testing and vaccination.
Case definition
A confirmed case was defined as a shelter resident
with a laboratory confirmation [positive immuno-
globulin (Ig)M, fourfold increase in IgG, or a positive
polymerase chain reaction (PCR)] and clinical symp-
toms (o3 days of maculo-papular rash and fever and
cough or catarrh or Koplik spots or conjunctivitis)
with disease onset between 13 October and 11
December 2010. A suspected case was defined as a
shelter resident with the above-mentioned clinical
symptoms and disease onset, but without laboratory
test results. We assumed every resident to have been
exposed to a measles case due to the crowded living
conditions at the shelter.
Laboratory analyses and persons eligible for
vaccination
Residents with measles symptoms identified at the
shelter’s medical post or the local hospital were tested
for MV-specific IgM and IgG antibodies, as well as
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MV-specific nucleic acid by PCR at either the local
hospital or a large regional laboratory in Hamburg
(y60 km from the shelter). In addition, oral swabs of
suspected cases were sent for genotyping [16] to the
National Reference Center (NRZ) for MMR.
Blood samples of participating shelter residents
were sent to and analysed within 1 day at the labora-
tory in Hamburg. An enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA) test (Virotech, Germany) was used to
determine IgG antibody titres. A test was declared
positive if titres were >11 Virotech units (VE)
[VE=(OD serum/OD cut-off)r10], borderline if
9–11 VE, and negative if <9 VE. All residents with a
negative or borderline IgG test result or no test result
available and who were not pregnant or aged f6
months were offered a MMR vaccination.
Immunization cards of all employees working in
the shelter were checked to assess their immunization
status. Employees without sufficient protection ac-
cording to STIKO recommendations were offered
vaccination.
Evaluation of the two containment strategies
We evaluated two containment strategies in terms of
potentially avoided cases, logistics and costs : sero-
logical testing followed by selective vaccination vs. a
hypothetical mass vaccination immediately starting
after the first diagnosed measles case.
Potentially avoided cases by immediate mass
vaccination
We made three assumptions to assess the number of
potentially avoided cases by immediate mass vacci-
nation. First, a mass vaccination would have started
the day after the first correctly diagnosed measles case
(2 November) and therefore 18 days earlier than
during the actual outbreak intervention. Second, we
assumed the commonly acknowledged mean incu-
bation period for measles from infection to onset of
rash of 14 days (range 7–18 days) [1, 2, 17] to calculate
the assumed time-point of infection. Third, we as-
sumed that a mass vaccination would have targeted
all persons included in the STIKO recommendations.
Based on those assumptions, we reviewed all cases
occurring after 2 November.
Outbreak intervention logistics
We closely documented the logistics of the conducted
outbreak intervention. The goal of this precise
description was to evaluate the operability and
specific challenges encountered during the serological
testing strategy and then compare the findings to an-
ticipated logistical steps and infrastructural needs in a
mass vaccination.
Name and date of birth on each identity card were
double-checked with the information on the official
residents list, name on the test tube, and the labora-
tory request form prior to blood drawing. Blood
samples were collected at the end of each intervention
day and analysed immediately, even on the weekend.
Names on the test tubes and the laboratory request
forms were handwritten and then translated into the
laboratory computer system. We matched incoming
test results with the residents list of persons that came
for testing. Shelter staff sought out residents indi-
vidually to communicate the test findings. If the test
result was seronegative or borderline, residents were
asked to attend for vaccination during the following
2 days. Further, all residents who opted not to par-
ticipate in the serological testing were offered a vac-
cination. If persons could not be contacted
personally, a message was left.
Cost assessment of the two strategies
We assessed medical and non-medical costs for both
strategies by reviewing outbreak-associated bills.
Medical costs included MMR vaccines, serological
testing, hospitalization, and costs for medical staff.
Non-medical costs incorporated personnel costs of the
shelter administration, translators, a police-enforced
curfew, and costs associated with an instantaneous
shelter transfer stop for new incoming or outgoing
asylum seekers. The bill review was supplemented by
stakeholder interviews (local health authorities, shel-
ter administration, shelter’s medical post, laboratory
staff, and vaccine manufacturer). Information con-
cerning the hypothetical mass vaccination was ex-
trapolated from actual outbreak figures and
stakeholder interviews. For the transfer stop we as-
sumed the moratorium to end about 2½ weeks after
the first case occurred. It was not possible to assign all
personnel costs in exact detail to each single logistical
step of the serological testing strategy. Therefore,
based on the observed length of the serological testing
strategy of 41 days (1 November to 11 December), we
calculated the personnel costs for the local health
authority as a fraction (18 days, 1–18 November).
Translator-associated costs were listed according
to the smaller number of required assignments.
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Personnel costs for the medical shelter’s post were
based on experiences during the intervention: total
number to be vaccinated and different vaccination
times needed per child (y15 min) and adult
(y10 min). In addition, we added medical shelter post
personnel costs related to other logistical tasks again
as a time fraction. Personnel costs of the shelter
administration were calculated by the shelter admin-
istration head with knowledge of the transfer stop
duration.
RESULTS
Epidemiological description and timeline of the
measles outbreak
A total of eight measles cases occurred over a period
of about 4 weeks in the 427 shelter residents, who
originated from 18 different nations (Afghanistan
25%, Serbia 17%, Macedonia 10%, Iraq 10%, Iran
7%, Syria 6%, Turkey 5%, and each of the following
below 5%: Azerbaijan, Somalia, Kosovo, Russian
Federation, Eritrea, Algeria, Vietnam, Armenia,
Yemen, Ghana, India). A total of 254 (59.2%) of the
residents were male and 172 female (40.3%). The
median age was 23 years (range 14 days to 67 years).
There were 145 (34%) children aged f18 years, 229
(53.9%) persons aged 19–40 years, and 51 (12%)
aged >40 years. No information on nationality, age
or sex was available for two long-term absent re-
sidents.
The median age of the eight cases was 19 years
(range 4–30 years). Four (50%) were female, two
of them were pregnant. Six (75%) out of eight cases
had to be hospitalized with an average duration
of 4 days. All eight cases were confirmed measles
cases : four were confirmed by PCR, three by MV-
specific IgM, and one by an increase in MV-specific
IgG titre. Genotyping identified MV genotype D4
Hamburg [16] as the causative strain of the outbreak.
The timeline of the outbreak with date of symptom
onset in cases is presented in Figure 1. The first
measles case was a 30-year-old woman with disease
onset on 21 October, whose rash was misdiagnosed by
a physician as a generalized allergy. On 1 November,
her 5-year-old son (case 2) developed a rash that lead
to the correct diagnosis of measles. Case 3 was a
19-year-old pregnant woman (8th month), who was
diagnosed with a measles infection on 3 November
and went into fever-induced labour on the same
day. The child was given immunoglobulins on day 3
postpartum and showed no signs of infection later.
Case 4 (4 years), case 7 (6 years) and case 8 (25 years)
lived on the same floor as the first two cases. Case 8
was 8 months pregnant, and the mother of cases 4
and 7. Cases 5 and 6 were young adults of different
nationalities that had no different epidemiological
link to the other cases than using the common shelter
facilities. It could not be resolved where the index case
had contracted her measles infection. She and her
family had entered Germany on 4 October from
Hungary and arrived in the shelter 10 days later, after
having passed through two other asylum shelters in a
different federal state in Germany. No associated
measles cases were reported from those two shelters
or the surrounding health districts.
Simultaneously with the report of the first
correctly diagnosed measles case (case 2), the local
health authorities issued an immediate transfer stop
for the shelter that lasted from 1 November until
11 December. In addition, a police-enforced curfew
for all residents (enforcing shelter residents not to
leave the compound) was declared on 1 November
but proved unmanageable and was thus ended after
27 h. The local health authorities requested outbreak
support from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) on 15
November. The voluntary serological testing and
selective vaccinations took place within the following
5 days (Fig. 1).
Forty-five (31%) out of 144 shelter employees
received a MMR vaccination due to unknown or in-
complete vaccination status. None of the employees
contracted a measles infection. No measles cases were
reported outside the shelter during the outbreak per-
iod, but it cannot be ruled out that cases occurred
without being reported.
Serological test results and persons eligible for
vaccination
None of the residents was able to provide immuniz-
ation documentation. Three hundred (70.3%) out of
427 shelter residents participated in the voluntary
serological testing, of whom 39 (13%) tested negative
for MV-specific IgG. Children aged <9 months were
not tested for MV-specific antibodies. Figure 2 shows
the proportion of seronegative persons by age group.
The attack rate in all residents was 1.9% (8/427), and
in seronegative individuals including cases it was 17%
(8/47).
Regarding non-tested individuals, a total of 166
persons were considered for vaccination. However,
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22 (13.3%) were or could not be offered a vaccination
due to pregnancy (n=7), age f6 months (n=4),
having become a confirmed case (n=4), being an un-
confirmed but suspected case (n=3), long-term ab-
senteeism from the shelter (n=3), or refusal of
vaccination (n=1). Of the remaining 144 eligible in-
dividuals, 101 (70.1%) were vaccinated during a
2-day vaccination operation, including two children
aged between >6 and f8 months. In the following
week, another seven (4.9%) residents requested vacci-
nation at the shelter’s medical post.
Potentially avoided cases by immediate mass
vaccination
Based on the current STIKO guidelines, residents’ age
distribution, and individual reasons for exclusion,
359/427 (84%) residents would have been eligible for

















Fig. 1. Timeline of the measles outbreak in an asylum-seekers’ shelter in Northern Germany, October/November 2010.
Identical shading indicates members of the same family.
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not tested n = 15 of 92 tested n = 24 of 167 tested n = 0 of 41 tested
40 years18 years to
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Fig. 2. Percentage of measles IgG seronegatives among those tested (n=300) by age group during a measles outbreak in an
asylum-seekers’ shelter in Northern Germany, 2010.
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vaccination. Under our previously described as-
sumptions with a mean incubation period of 14 days,
an immediate mass vaccination might have avoided
three cases (Fig. 3). Considering a range of 7–18 days,
the figure did not change substantially with 3–4
possibly avoided cases.
Outbreak intervention logistics
It often proved difficult to assign the identity card
name to the corresponding name on the official list
due to transpositions of first and last name, serious
spelling mistakes, and middle names being added as
another last name or vice versa. Furthermore, birth-
dates sometimes did not match between the two
sources. A number of people were not listed at all, yet
they possessed a shelter-issued identity card. Another
group not listed were children that were additionally
not registered on a parent’s identity card.
In five (2%) cases we detected names on test tubes
that were different from the person from whom blood
was to be drawn. During the matching of the labora-
tory results with our residents list of serological tes-
ters, we found in 6% (17/300) new serious spelling
mistakes or transpositions of first and last names that
had occurred during laboratory transcription.
Necessary resident contacts added up to four
encounters to communicate findings and carry
out intervention procedures for the serological
testing strategy (information for residents, blood col-
lection, information about the results, and possible
vaccination), compared to two for a mass vaccination
(information on the vaccination procedure and risks,
and the vaccination itself ).
Cost assessment of the two strategies
Medical and non-medical costs for the two strategies
are listed in Table 1. The serological testing with
selective vaccination amounted to yE90 000 and was
nearly double the costs of a hypothetical mass vacci-
nation (yE47000). The shelter transfer stop sub-
stantially contributed with yE34000 to the total
costs of the serological testing strategy, compared to
yE4000 in the hypothetical mass vaccination.
Reviewed bills and the interview with the head of the
shelter administration revealed that those costs in-
crease exponentially over time instead of linearly.
DISCUSSION
The main aim of our study was to compare two con-
tainment strategies in terms of potentially avoided
cases, logistics, and costs. Our findings related to
these three aspects clearly favour a mass vaccination
strategy in such a setting.
A very important evaluation factor is the number of
potentially avoided cases, as they are the main goal of
each outbreak containment effort. Applying the mean
incubation period of 14 days until rash onset, the im-
mediate mass vaccination might have avoided three of






Mean incubation period 14 days
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Fig. 3. Potentially avoided measles cases by a hypothetical immediate mass vaccination during an outbreak in an asylum-
seekers’ shelter in Northern Germany, 2010. Cases are represented by squares, potentially avoided cases are marked with a
black cross (X).
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in vaccinated individuals develops, two recent studies
have shown an effective measles post-exposure
prophylaxis (PEP) of 90.5% and 100%, respectively,
if conducted within 72 h [18, 19]. In individuals who
developed measles despite PEP, two other studies
observed a maximum time-interval from receiving
PEP to the development of measles of y10 days
[20, 21]. For a conservative estimate we assumed that
case 4 would still have developed the disease.
However, based on the data from the studies cited
above, it is quite likely that case 4 would also have
been avoided by mass vaccination or at least benefited
from vaccination, as even vaccination during the in-
cubation period might mitigate measles symptoms
[22]. Case 8 was pregnant and would not have been
vaccinated at any point. However, a comprehensive
vaccination of the shelter community (including her
two children, later cases 4 and 7) might have granted
her herd protection, possibly preventing her from be-
coming infected.
Logistics associated with the serological testing
proved to be challenging in this special setting. A
good laboratory infrastructure as in our study is not
always available, and less timely receipt of results
prolongs the time needed to complete subsequent
vaccinations. Furthermore, the proportion of children
in the shelter was high. In this age group, blood
drawing and vaccinations on average require more
time, and a second, needle-associated intervention (if
seronegative) is usually more stressful for children
than for adults. Only two-thirds of the residents par-
ticipated in the voluntary serological testing. In ad-
dition to the seronegatives, the remaining 127 persons
were therefore eligible for vaccination due to their
unknown serological status. Finally, the selective
vaccination strategy required four contacts between
Table 1. Comparison of outbreak-associated costs for the two containment strategies during a measles outbreak in
an asylum-seekers’ shelter in Northern Germany, 2010
Serological testing and selective
vaccination Mass vaccination
Number of units Total (E) Number of units Total (E)
Medical costs
Resources
Serological testing* N=300 3330.00
Vaccines#
Shelter residents N=144 5119.20 N=359 12762.45
Shelter staff N=45 1599.75 N=45 1599.75
Hospitalizations
Case 2 3 d 1653.42 3 d 1653.42
Case 3 6 d 1760.66 6 d 1760.66
Case 4 5 d 1743.42 5 d 1743.42
Case 5 3 d 1427.15
Case 7 4 d 1563.42
Case 8 3 d 1518.42 3 d 1518.42
Personnel costs
Local health authority 211 h$ 10516.70 91 h$ 4525.86
Shelter medical post 519 h$ 15439.75 277 h$ 7854.69
Non-medical costs
Resources
Shelter transfer stop 41 d 33807.23 18 d 3926.30
Personnel costs
Shelter administration 77 h$ 3865.60 70 h$ 3607.45
Translators 2563.66 2299.48
Police-enforced curfew (27 h) 108 h 4428.00 108 h 4428.00
Total 90336.38 47679.90
d, Days ; h, hours.
* Unitary cost : E11.10.
# Unitary cost : E35.55.
$ Different wages per hour according to position, only total number of hours given.
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residents and the intervention team compared to two
in a mass vaccination. The more contacts that are re-
quired, the higher the chance that residents do not
complete all steps necessary for a successful contain-
ment intervention.
Overall costs associated with the outbreak were
high, even though the outbreak consisted of only eight
measles cases. Costs for the serological testing and
selective vaccination strategy were nearly double
those anticipated for the hypothetical mass vacci-
nation. About one third of the costs in the serological
testing strategy were attributable to the 6 weeks shel-
ter transfer stop. As a short closure of 2–3 weeks can
be compensated for with personnel resources at hand,
longer closures require extra resources after re-
opening: besides the timely resumption of a high
volume of delayed hearings, a high number of asylum
seekers has to be admitted in a short time period to be
able to fulfil the preset yearly intake quota. Further-
more, personnel costs made for substantial relative
cost differences in both containment strategies.
In our study we compared two interventions that
would have taken place at different time points.
However, local health authorities are very likely to
decide whether to conduct serological testing with
selective vaccination or an immediate mass vacci-
nation referring to the same point in time. If so, there
are several conceptual thoughts to consider. In prin-
ciple, the duration of both interventions depends on
resource- and infrastructure-related factors. The dur-
ation of blood sampling and vaccination is associated
with the number of medical staff available, the num-
ber of residents in the shelter, and the proportion of
children among residents. For the serological testing
strategy, the expenditure of time is additionally re-
lated to the expected number of seronegatives with
subsequent vaccination among shelter residents. The
length of laboratory analysis is determined by the
testing capacity of the laboratory and by the duration
and frequency of specimen shipments to the labora-
tory (each day vs. once only). Thus, the time between
diagnosis of the index case and vaccination of the last
eligible person can be several days longer for the
serological testing strategy than in our outbreak, in-
creasing the risk of secondary measles cases. If per-
sonnel resources and infrastructure are limited,
concentrating on an immediate mass vaccination will
increase the chances of staying within the desired 72 h
for PEP. Of course, timelines of serological testing can
be enhanced by increasing the deployed personnel in
the intervention. However, increasing the involved
personnel would lead to a substantial increase in
personnel-related costs – contradicting one of the
common arguments that serological testing is more
cost-effective compared to an immediate mass vacci-
nation.
During a mass vaccination campaign, some pre-
viously vaccinated individuals without immunization
documentation will consequently receive an un-
necessary vaccination. Multiple vaccinations often
raise concerns about tolerability and adverse effects.
However, there are no references in the literature that
support those concerns [4, 23, 24]. One study found
no increased morbidity if MV-incubated persons
receive a MMR vaccination [22].
The relatively few cases and the prolonged outbreak
influenced the local health authorities’ decision for the
containment strategy of serological testing and selec-
tive vaccination. Possible reasons for the small num-
ber of cases despite crowded living conditions and a
measles basic reproductive number of 12–16 [3] might
be that with 85% protected individuals the effective
reproductive number was considerably lower and that
more heterogeneous rather than homogeneous mixing
occurred. Both conditions have the potential to lead
to prolonged and less explosive outbreaks.
Seroprevalence studies for vaccine-preventable dis-
eases in non-outbreak situations in refugees or asylum
seekers have been previously conducted [25, 26].
However, characteristics and demographics of per-
sons fleeing a specific country can change quickly over
time depending on the situation in the country of
origin. At the shelter level, the number of immune
individuals depends greatly on the composition of
nationalities in the shelter, the demographics of the
citizens as well as individual immunization pro-
grammes and circulation of the wild virus in each of
the countries of origin. Therefore, seroprevalence
studies in these settings remain a snapshot in time
with limited value for translatability and thus should
not be used as a basis for selective vaccination inter-
ventions in outbreaks. Nonetheless, our study as well
as the other surveys demonstrates that the proportion
of individuals with measles immunity is likely below
95% in asylum shelters or refugee settings. Hence,
outbreaks can easily occur if the virus is introduced.
There are several limitations to our study. MMR
vaccine prices are specific to Germany and can be
more expensive than in other countries (e.g. E35.50 in
Germany vs. yE13 for children and yE23 for adults
in the USA) [27, 28]. Similarly, personnel costs
and costs related to the shelter transfer stop are
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country-dependent, composed differently or might
not apply. Therefore, our study might have limited
transferability across countries. In addition, our study
is specific for the setting of an asylum shelter or simi-
lar refugee camps where immunization records are
generally not available and logistical problems due to
language barriers or cultural differences might have a
higher impact. Nonetheless, our study provides im-
portant insights and challenges for the control of an
institutional outbreak of measles which involves re-
fugees and asylum seekers. It also draws attention to a
probably previously under-appreciated setting where
Germany – among other issues – is facing difficulties
in its efforts to achieve measles elimination by 2015.
One solution to generally prevent future outbreaks
in asylum shelters is to improve vaccination practices
routinely offered at first intake. Whereby the statutory
medical examination taking place within the first days
of entry would be a reasonable and easy to execute
option for routine vaccinations. In our case, a vacci-
nation of the index person and her family at intake in
the very first asylum shelter after arrival in Germany
on 4 October would have most likely prevented the
later outbreak. However, the wide implementation of
this policy is highly dependent on available staff and
resources in the local health offices and shelter medi-
cal posts. In the affected shelter, only 84% of the
children were protected against measles, compared to
the one-dose measles vaccination coverage at school
entry in Germany in 2009 where the figure was 96.1%
[29]. As Germany is responsible for the health of
persons that have claimed asylum status on its terri-
tory and has committed to the WHO goal of measles
elimination in Europe by 2015, improved implemen-
tation of routine vaccination at first intake could
be helpful towards preventing future outbreaks in
asylum shelters and the subsequent spread of measles
into communities outside these settings.
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